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Eyewitness identification confidence
Abstract
The production has been staged many times over the last decade. Although the plot and cast of characters have
often varied, the story always involves a crime, a number of unsuspecting eyewitnesses, and an attempt to
identify the criminal. Despite these variations, the ending usually remains the same: Some eyewitnesses feel
certain they have identified the perpetrator; others lack that certainty. The accuracy of a witness's testimony
cannot, however, necessarily be garnered from the certainty he or she expresses. Eyewitness confidence has
been found to account for less than 10 percent of the variance in eyewitness identification accuracy (Wells &
Murray, 1984).
Eyewitness confidence and eyewitness accuracy are often poorly calibrated (for example, Bothwell,
Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 1987; Deffenbacher, 1980; Leippe, 1980; Wells & Murray, 1983, 1984). However,
jurors tend to rely heavily on eyewitness confidence to infer witness accuracy (for example, Cutler, Penrod, &
Stuve, 1988; Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979). For example, Wells,
Lindsay, and Ferguson found that subject-jurors’ ascriptions of eyewitness confidence accounted for 50
percent of the variance in their assessments of eyewitness accuracy. Furthermore, the United States judiciary
recognizes confidence as a key factor to be considered in deciding the accuracy of eyewitness testimony (Neil
v. Biggers, 1972). Given the persuasive power that eyewitness confidence can have in the criminal justice
system, it is important to understand the factors that influence eyewitness confidence, particularly those
factors that can weaken or destroy an existing confidence-accuracy relationship.
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The production has been staged many times over the last decade. Although 
the plot and cast of characters have often varied, the story always involves a 
crime, a number of unsuspecting eyewitnesses, and an attempt to identify the 
criminal. Despite these variations, the ending usually remains the same: Some 
eyewitnesses feel certain they have identified the perpetrator; others lack that 
certainty. The accuracy of a witness's testimony.cannot, however, necessarily 
be garnered from the certainty he or she expresses. Eyewitness confidence 
has been found to account for less than 10 percent of the variance in eyewitness 
identification accuracy (Wells & Murray, 1984). 
Eyewitness confidence and eyewitness accuracy are often poorly calibrated 
(for example, Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 1987; Deffenbacher, 
1980; Leippe, 1980; Wells & Murray, 1983, 1984). However, jurors tend to 
rely heavily on eyewitness confidence to infer witness accuracy (for example, 
Cutler, Penrod, & Stuve, 1988; Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981; Wells, 
Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979). For example, Wells, Lindsay, and Ferguson 
found that subject-jurors' ascriptions of eyewitness confidence accounted for 
50 percent of the variance in their assessments of eyewitness accuracy. Fur-
thermore, the United States judiciary recognizes confidence as a key factor 
to be considered in deciding the accuracy of eyewitness testimony (Neil v. 
Biggers, 1972). Given the persuasive power that eyewitness confidence can 
have in the criminal justice system, it is important to understand the factors 
that influence eyewitness confidence, particularly those factors that can 
weaken or destroy an existing confidence-accuracy relationship. 
To date, four separate reviews of the accuracy-confidence relationship have 
concluded that we should not necessarily expect a relationship between eye-
witness accuracy and confidence (Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 1987; 
Deffenbacher, 1980; Leippe, 1980; Wells & Murray, 1984). These reviews 
offered suggestions as to why eyewitness accuracy and confidence are often 
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poorly related. Wells and Murray (1984) suggested that the variation in ac-
curacy-confidence correlations across studies might reflect variation in the 
researchers' procedures and statistical analyses. Deffenbacher (1980) and 
Bothwell et al. (1986) suggested that the confidence-accuracy relationship is 
moderated by the quality of the encoding conditions existing at the time an 
eyewitness observes a crime; the better the encoding conditions, the stronger 
the accuracy-confidence relationship. Leippe (1980) proposed that eyewitness 
accuracy and confidence could be controlled by different mechanisms. That 
is, some factors could influence accuracy while having no effect on confidence 
and other factors could influence confidence but not accuracy. 
In this chapter, we will review each of these suggestions. More specifically, 
we will review literature concerning methodological issues involved in as-
sessing confidence-accuracy relationships, moderators of the confidence-ac-
curacy relationship, and the malleability of eyewitness confidence independent 
of eyewitness accuracy. In addition, we will present some of our recent findings 
concerning confidence malleability. 
Eyewitness confidence can be broadly defined to include witnesses' beliefs 
in the accuracy of their judgments concerning various aspects of a witnessed 
event (for example, what was said, the sequence of events, the perpetrator's 
appearance and attire, the victim, the duration of the event). We will restrict 
our review to studies of eyewitnesses' confidence in their lineup identification 
decisions. Furthermore, our discussion is restricted to forensically relevant 
situations rather than a general confidence-accuracy relation. This focus re-
flects the differences that exist between lineup identification tasks and other 
tests of recognition memory (see Wells, in press). 
For example, whereas subjects in some memory experiments might attempt 
to recognize an array of previously encountered stimuli, eyewitnesses faced 
with a lineup identification task typically attempt to identify only one indi-
vidual from the lineup. Hence, in contrast to many other recognition memory 
tests, the eyewitness confidence-accuracy relation is derived from an inter-
individual (between-subjects) rather than an intraindividual (within-subjects) 
analysis. Each witness contributes only two data points to the correlation; 
one accuracy score and one confidence rating. The analysis then compares 
the identification decisions and confidence ratings of different witnesses rather 
than the responses of a single witness across a number of face recognition 
trials. It cannot, therefore, separate individual differences in ·confidence 
among eyewitnesses from the identification decisions those witnesses make 
(see Smith, Kassin, & Ellsworth, 1989). Yet researchers interested in the 
confidence-accuracy relation will likely remain committed to an interindivi-
dual focus given its forensic relevance. In actual cases, the court is concerned 
with a witness's ability to recognize one particular individual rather than his 
or her facial recognition performance across a number of identification tasks. 
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Methodological considerations in assessing the confidence-accuracy 
relationship 
The need for target-absent lineups 
Wells and Murray's (1984) review identified thirteen studies that found a 
significant positive correlation between eyewitness accuracy and confidence 
and eighteen studies that found a negative or no relation between accuracy 
and confidence. They suggested that methodological factors might account 
for the inconsistencies in the literature. In particular, they noted that some 
studies included a target-absent lineup and others did not. 
Target-absent conditions must be included in order to make a true assess-
ment of the confidence-accuracy relation, because this assessment does not 
depend on an analysis of whether witnesses who choose the target are more 
confident in their choice than witnesses who instead choose a foil. (In actual 
cases, the police cannot know whether the perpetrator is present in the 
lineup.) Instead, the relevant comparison is between witnesses who choose 
the target when he or she is present in the lineup and witnesses who choose 
an innocent replacement for the target in a target-absent lineup (Wells & 
Lindsay, 1985). This reasoning follows from the premise that there is (or 
ought to be) only one suspect in real lineups and therefore the choice of a foil 
in a target-present lineup is a "known error" (see Wells & Turtle, 1986). A 
witness's confidence in a known error is forensically irrelevant because such 
an identification would never lead to prosecution of the individual identified. 
In comparing studies that yielded a significant accuracy-confidence corre-
lation with those that did not, Wells and Murray noted that many of the 
former investigations used only target-present lineups. Studies that include 
target-present and target-absent lineups commonly obtain a significant rela-
tion between confidence and accuracy when the target is present, but yield 
no such relation when the target is absent from the lineup. "This suggests 
that any positive relationship between confidence and accuracy with perpe-
trator-present lineups may be cancelled by a negative relationship that obtains 
with perpetrator-absent lineups!" (p. 163). 
Errors of commission versus errors of omission 
Wells and Lindsay (1985) also stressed the importance of discerning between 
incorrect choices from lineups (that is, errors of commission) and incorrect 
rejections (that is, errors of omission). Collapsing across errors of choosers 
and nonchoosers in calculating the confidence-accuracy correlation obscures 
the forensic value of such an analysis. Consider, for example, the possibility 
that choosers are more likely to be correct than nonchoosers and that choosers 
are more confident than nonchoosers (or the reverse). An overall analysis 
Eyewitness identification confidence 351 
(collapsed over choosers and nonchoosers) would indicate a significant con-
fidence-accuracy relation even if those witnesses who make false identifica-
tions are as confident as those who correctly identify the target and those 
who make incorrect rejections are as confident as those who correctly make 
no choice. In other words, the confidence-accuracy relation in the overall 
analysis would be misleading from a forensic perspective. Practically speaking, 
it is of no value to determine whether confident choosers are more accurate 
than nonconfident nonchoosers, particularly if the relation is based on wit-
nesses' status as choosers or nonchoosers rather than their status as confident 
or nonconfident. 
The confidence main-effect issue 
There is one further methodological issue that is important from an applied 
perspective. The issue (not previously discussed in the literature) is as follows. 
Every time a researcher conducts an eyewitness identification study, the av-
erage confidence of witnesses tends to vary. In one experiment, for instance, 
the mean confidence might be 3.8 on a seven-point scale whereas in another 
experiment the mean confidence might be 5.3. Sources of this variance are 
innumerable, including such factors as the subject population, the nature of 
the witnessed event, and so on. 
If we look within experiments, we might find a confidence-accuracy rela-
tion. Suppose, for example, the mean confidence of an accurate witness is 
4.1 in the first experiment and the mean for an inaccurate witness is 3.5. 
Similarly, suppose that the means for accurate and inaccurate witnesses in 
the second experiment are 5.6 and 5.0, respectively. Suppose that the 
confidence-accuracy correlation is .30 within each experiment. Suppose fur-
ther that we wish to apply our knowledge of a .30 correlation to a given real 
world case. Consider the case where we have a real world witness who is 4.8 
in confidence. Do we consider that level of confidence to be high or low? In 
the context of the first experiment, we would consider this a high level of 
confidence and tend to believe this witness's identification decision. In the 
context of the second experiment, we would consider this low confidence and 
tend not to believe the eyewitness. 
In reality, the witness is from neither experiment, and herein lies the critical 
issue. Without some idea of the role played by main effects on mean confi-
dence and the factors that govern it, it is impossible to know how to read the 
confidence of a witness in a real case in isolation. Our analyses in experiments 
are better suited to a special real world case in which there are multiple 
witnesses (who had comparable views of the culprit) who disagree in their 
identifications of the culprit. In such a case, to the extent that we have 
established a confidence-accuracy relation in our experiments, we would tend 
to believe the confident witnesses over the nonconfident witnesses. In cases 
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where there is only one eyewitness, there can be no mean confidence estimate 
of accurate versus inaccurate witnesses and thus no clear anchor with which 
to compare the confidence of this particular witness. 
Perhaps another way to consider this issue is to note that in an experiment 
we use statistics uninfluenced by the mean level of confidence obtained from 
the subjects. In real cases, however, we must contend with this issue while 
being in the dark. Consider, for example, an experiment that produces a 
mean confidence rating of 6.1 on a seven-point scale among witnesses who 
identify someone from the lineup. Assume virtually no witnesses fell below 
5.0 in confidence and yet 45 percent of the witnesses have made false iden-
tifications. Suppose we find a correlation of .40 between confidence and ac-
curacy. What then will we do in a real case if we encounter a witness whose 
self-rated confidence is 6.0? Can we consider this witness highly confident, 
even though his or her confidence falls below the mean in this most recently 
conducted experiment? 
The general point of these observations is that a cutoff on a confidence 
scale wherein higher levels suggest the witness is accurate and lower levels 
suggest the witness is inaccurate will vary from one experiment to the next. 
Undoubtedly, such variation would also occur from one real world case to 
another. Accordingly, it is difficult to assess the validity of eyewitnesses' 
confidence in actual cases. 
Moderators of the confidence-accuracy relationship 
Recent research has sought to develop an understanding of the conditions 
that foster or inhibit accuracy-confidence relationships. This research has 
progressed in accordance with two different perspectives, emphasizing a focus 
on either encoding (that is, witnessing) or retrieval (that is, identification) 
conditions. These two different approaches represent the distinction Wells 
(1978) has articulated between estimator and system variables. Estimator 
variables operate at the encoding stage of memory (viewing conditions) and 
are outside the control of the legal system. Although estimator variables can 
be controlled in research experiments, in actual cases their effects can only 
be estimated. System variables, on the other hand, are postwitnessed event 
variables (for example, lineup identification instructions) that are under at 
least some control by the legal system. They can be manipulated to maximize 
the correspondence between eyewitness accuracy and confidence. 
Estimator variables as moderators of 
confidence-accuracy relationships 
Deffenbacher (1980) advanced one of the first proposals concerning possible 
estimator variable moderators of the confidence-accuracy relationship, which 
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he called the "optimality" hypothesis. According to Deffenbacher, the con-
fidence-accuracy relationship is moderated by the quality of the encoding 
conditions at the time an eyewitness observes a crime; the better the encoding 
conditions, the stronger the accuracy-confidence relationship. Characteristics 
of the encoding conditions could potentially involve qualities of the situation, 
the target person, and/or the witness (Brigham, 1990; Hosch, this volume). 
We will review each of these variables in turn. 
Characteristics of the situation. Empirical tests of the optimality hypothesis 
have been largely restricted to studies of the role of situational characteristics 
(for example, target exposure time) in confidence-accuracy relations. Con-
sistent with the notion that optimal encoding conditions should enhance the 
confidence-accuracy relation, a recent meta-analysis indicated that variation 
in exposure time to the target person's face accounted for "as much as 27 
percent of the variation in the predictability of accuracy from confidence" 
(Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 1987, p. 694). 
In contrast to the findings of this meta-analysis, however, and the intuitive 
appeal of the premise, the optimality hypothesis has received little support 
from studies that have manipulated witnesses' opportunities to view the target 
(Brigham, 1990; Lindsay, Wells, & Ferguson, 1979). For example, Lindsay, 
Wells, and Ferguson (1979) varied witnessing conditions and determined that 
changes in eyewitness accuracy were not associated with changes in eyewitness 
confidence or with the magnitude of the confidence-accuracy relation. In this 
study, eyewitness accuracy was varied by exposing subject-witnesses to a 
staged theft under one of three types of viewing conditions that varied in 
terms of how good a view they afforded of the thief (for example, varying 
such factors as the amount of viewing time and whether or not the thief wore 
a hat that masked his hair). This manipulation produced significant differences 
in accuracy among groups. Changes in accuracy, however, were not accom-
panied by changes in confidence or by changes in the confidence-accuracy 
relation. 
Characteristics of the target. One dimension along which the quality of en-
coding conditions can vary is the target person's appearance. People's faces 
vary in attractiveness and distinctiveness. Unattractive or distinctive looking 
faces are typically easier to remember or identify than attractive or unexcep-
tional faces (for example, Mueller, Heesacker, & Ross, 1984; Shapiro & 
Penrod, 1986; Brigham, 1990). Brigham (1990) tested the idea that distinctive 
looking or unattractive targets afford the witness an optimal viewing situation 
and thus should be associated with strong positive accuracy-confidence cor-
relations. Consistent with this prediction, he found that the confidence-
accuracy relation was stronger when the target's face was distinctive rather 
than nondistinctive and unattractive rather than attractive. 
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Characteristics of the witness. A small number of studies have sought to de-
termine whether there are individual differences that moderate the confi-
dence-accuracy relation (see Hosch, this volume, for a more extensive 
discussion of individual differences between witnesses). This research suggests 
two factors that might moderate the confidence-accuracy relation: the will-
ingness of witnesses to choose someone from a lineup or photo spread (Fleet, 
Brigham, & Bothwell, 1987; Pigott & Brigham, 1985; and public self-
consciousness, that is, a dispositional focus on the outward, observable aspects 
of oneself (Kassin, Rigby, & Castillo, 1991). 
The former studies have found stronger accuracy-confidence correlations 
among witnesses who chose someone from the lineup they viewed than among 
nonchoosers. The reliability and forensic value of this finding, however, must 
be considered questionable given the recommendations of Wells and Lindsay 
(1985) discussed previously. Recall that Wells and Lindsay noted that a fo-
rensically relevant assessment of the confidence-accuracy relationship derives 
from a comparison of witnesses who choose the target from a target-present 
lineup and witnesses who choose an innocent replacement for the target from 
a target-absent lineup. 
System variable moderators of confidence-accuracy relationships. The one 
successful investigation of system variables that might moderate the accuracy-
confidence relationship was conducted by Kassin (1985). In a series of four 
experiments, Kassin demonstrated that the accuracy-confidence relation 
could be improved by allowing witnesses to view videotapes of themselves 
making their identifications from a photo spread before asking them to rate 
their confidence in their identifications. Kassin claimed that witnesses gained 
"retrospective self-awareness" (RSA) from this procedure. 
Kassin suggested two reasons for the success of RSA in improving the 
accuracy-confidence relation. First, from a self-perception perspective, it may 
have provided witnesses with an opportunity to make relevant inferences 
based on their overt behavior. Witnesses may, for example, have inferred 
that the quicker they made a decision, the more likely they were to be ac-
curate. Second, RSA may have allowed witnesses to reexperience the thoughts 
they had when they first viewed the lineup and made an identification decision. 
Follow-up research (Kassin, Rigby, & Castillo, 1991) suggests that RSA 
enhances the confidence-accuracy relation primarily because of a modified 
self-perception hypothesis, that is, one that applies to witnesses high but not 
low in public self-consciousness. "Specifically, people who are predisposed 
to focus on their public behavior and appearance are uniquely sensitive to 
subtle cues that betray the ease or difficulty with which they made their 
decision" (Kassin et al., 1991, p. 704). 
Researchers concerned with moderators of the confidence-accuracy rela-
tion should consider the forensic value of their findings. Here, the distinction 
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between system and estimator variables is important. Findings concerning 
estimator variable moderators of confidence-accuracy relationships are fo-
rensically valuable insofar as they can be incorporated into either expert 
testimony or jury instructions and then used by jurors to decide how much 
weight to assign to a witness's identification testimony. Such findings cannot 
be used, however, to increase the actual confidence-accuracy relation. Knowl-
edge of system variable moderators, on the other hand, can be used to develop 
procedures designed to optimize the confidence-accuracy relation in actual 
cases. Given the forensic value of such knowledge, we recommend that future 
research be devoted to first identifying system variable moderators of the CA 
relation and then using these data to develop procedures designed to maximize 
the correspondence between confidence and accuracy. 
The malleability of eyewitness confidence 
Leippe (1980) suggested that we should not necessarily expect a relationship 
between eyewitness accuracy and confidence because the human information 
processing systems seem "capable of altering memory and confidence in or-
thogonal directions, especially in the context of powerful and rich social 
situations" (p.271). Leippe suggested that eyewitness accuracy and confidence 
could be controlled by different mechanisms. That is, some factors could 
influence accuracy but have no effect on confidence and other factors could 
influence confidence but not accuracy. 
For example, in judging the likelihood that their memories are accurate, 
witnesses presumably use a heuristic in which the vividness of their recollec-
tions serves as a cue to the accuracy of the underlying memory. A vivid 
recollection is considered indicative of an accurate memory. To the extent 
that witnesses are unaware of encoding or witnessing conditions that can cause 
memory inaccuracies, however, such as short target exposure time (Shapiro 
& Penrod, 1986) and low perceived crime seriousness (Leippe, Wells, & 
Ostrom, 1978), they might vividly recall a distorted or inaccurately encoded 
memory. Alternatively, social influences, such as discussion with other people 
present at the scene of a crime might "corroborate" a witness's memory and 
thus enhance the strength of his or her belief in the accuracy of the recollection 
of what happened, rather than influence the vividness of the recollection. 
Although numerous studies have confirmed the malleability of eyewitness 
memory, there has been little theorizing or research devoted to confidence 
malleability. Only two studies (Luus & Wells, 1991; Wells, Ferguson, & 
Lindsay, 1981) have investigated Leippe's (1980) suggestion that certain fac-
tors might influence eyewitness confidence but have no effect on accuracy. 
In both these studies, manipulations designed to alter witnesses' confidence 
were introduced after they had made their identifications, thereby isolating 
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confidence and eliminating any possibility that changes in accuracy might 
accompany changes in confidence. 
Wells, Ferguson, & Lindsay, 1981 
Drawing on Tesser's (1978) finding that people's attitudes tend to polarize 
with postexposure thought about a stimulus, Leippe (1980) proposed that the 
confidence of eyewitnesses might increase with postidentification thought 
about their lineup choices. Wells et al. (1981) tested Leippe's suggestion by 
staging thefts for unsuspecting witnesses who first attempted to identify the 
thief from a photo spread and then were cross-examined. Prior to the cross-
examination, half the witnesses were induced to think about their lineup 
choices. They were briefed about the types of questions they could expect 
under cross-examination and were encouraged to rehearse possible answers 
to these questions. The remaining witnesses received no such instruction. The 
briefings were expected to increase thinking about the witnessed event (in-
cluding lineup choice) and thus bolster eyewitness confidence. Elevated con-
fidence was expected to enhance perceived eyewitness credibility. 
The results indicated that witnesses who had been briefed expressed more 
confidence in their identifications than did those who were not briefed. The 
elevated confidence associated with the briefing manipulation was primarily 
attributable to increased certainty on the part of eyewitnesses who misiden-
tified the perpetrator. The briefing manipulation produced statistically sig-
nificant increases in expressed confidence for inaccurate but not accurate 
eyewitness identifications. Subject-jurors who viewed the witnesses' video-
taped testimony were unable to distinguish accurate from inaccurate eye-
witnesses. Subject-jurors were also significantly more likely to convict the 
accused if he had been identified by eyewitnesses who had been briefed rather 
than by an eyewitness who had not been briefed. 
Briefing witnesses before they take the stand is a common courtroom prac-
tice. It augments the difficulty of the task faced by jurors of distinguishing 
accurate from inaccurate eyewitness accounts. Unfortunately, the practice of 
briefing eyewitnesses is probably not the only source of inflated eyewitness 
confidence. In actual criminal cases, there are numerous events that might 
occur after an eyewitness makes an identification, but before giving testimony, 
that could affect the certainty with which that identification testimony is 
delivered. 
We have recently initiated a program of research designed to enhance our 
understanding of this issue. Our findings to date indicate that eyewitnesses 
can become more or less confident about their lineup choices as a function 
of social comparison information obtained after they have made their iden-
tifications. This research investigated the effects of informing witnesses of the 
identification decision of a co-witness (Luus & Wells, 1991). 
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Luus & Wells, 1991 
Our (1991) research tested the idea that eyewitness confidence might be 
influenced by knowledge of the identification decision made by a co-
eyewitness. It is not uncommon for more than one eyewitness to view a 
criminal event. Although modern eyewitness procedural guidelines firmly 
recommend that eyewitnesses be separated prior to and during lineup iden-
tification tasks (Wells, 1988), there are no prohibitions against discussing their 
identification decisions after the task. 
We noted that the role of social influence (the influence of other people) 
on the confidence of eyewitnesses has been limited to research and theory 
on the malleability of eyewitness memory with no attempt to examine its 
impact on eyewitness confidence. Furthermore, dominant theorizing about 
memory malleability has not adopted a social influence (for example, con-
formity, compliance, persuasion) perspective, but rather has operated from 
a reconstructive memory or other purely cognitive framework (Loftus, 1974). 
Recently, a social influence perspective, involving concepts such as conform-
ity, compliance, and source credibility has been advocated in the memory 
malleability research literature (for example, see McCloskey & Zaragoza, 
1987), but the role of social influence in eyewitness certainty has remained 
conspicuously absent. 
In addition, little attention has been paid to the processes that influence 
the genesis and expression of eyewitness identification confidence. We rea-
soned that given the weak relationship between eyewitness accuracy and 
confidence, it is unlikely that eyewitness identification confidence is a simple 
function of ecphoric similarity. Ecphoric similarity is the judged degree of 
resemblance between a memory trace and an external stimulus (Tulving, 
1981). Within the realm of an eyewitness identification task, a decision based 
on ecphoric similarity would derive from a comparison of the eyewitness's 
memory for the culprit and the physical appearance of the person chosen 
from the lineup. We do not believe that this is the type of judgment process 
that operates in eyewitness identification situations. Instead, we believe that 
eyewitness identification confidence is determined at least to some degree by 
factors that are not related to ecphoric similarity. 
To test this assumption, we staged thefts for pairs of unsuspecting witnesses, 
then had the witnesses attempt to identify the thief from a target-absent photo 
lineup. Biased instructions were used to induce false identifications. More 
specifically, we did not caution witnesses that the thief might not be present 
in the photo lineup (see Malpass & Devine, 1981). Instead, we instructed 
witnesses to indicate which of the lineup members they saw steal our equip-
ment. Following the identification task, witnesses were given randomly de-
termined information concerning the alleged identification decision of their 
co-witness. Some witnesses were led to believe that the co-witness identified 
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the same person they had. Others were informed that the co-witness had 
made a different decision when shown the lineup (either identifying a different 
individual or asserting that the thief was not present). All witnesses were then 
questioned (and videotaped) about their memory for the theft. The video-
taped interviews were later shown to subject-jurors who evaluated the wit-
nesses' credibility. 
Our results indicate that eyewitness confidence can be both raised and 
lowered by information concerning a co-witness's identification decision and 
that manipulated confidence can influence jurors' assessments of eyewitness 
credibility. Compared to a control condition in which witnesses received no 
information concerning their co-witness, co-witness agreement produced a 
robust inflation of confidence (mean = 8.77 on a ten-point scale) whereas 
co-witness disagreement produced a precipitous decline in confidence (mean 
= 4.67 on a ten-point scale). Note that this confidence deflation did not derive 
from the mere fact that the co-witness allegedly identified a different person 
from the lineup. Who the co-witness was said to have identified played a 
critical role in shaping the confidence of witnesses. Subject-witnesses who 
were led to believe that the co-witness identified someone who bore no re-
semblance to the culprit became more confident about the accuracy of their 
identifications (mean = 7.87 on a ten-point scale). Furthermore, witnesses 
whose confidence was either raised or lowered by information concerning the 
alleged identification decision of a co-eyewitness generally persevered in those 
levels of confidence. Their confidence ratings did not shift if they were sub-
sequently told that the co-witness information they had received was in error 
(see Table 16.1). In addition, the effects of the identification feedback ex-
tended beyond eyewitnesses' self-rated confidence to subject-jurors' ratings 
of perceived credibility. Subject-jurors' credibility ratings generally paralleled 
the witnesses' confidence ratings. 
Our findings suggest one reason why eyewitness confidence and eyewitness 
identification accuracy are not likely to be well correlated by the time witnesses 
take the stand in actual cases. Specifically, eyewitnesses might learn about 
the identification decisions of other witnesses prior to the trial or learn about 
other evidence consistent or inconsistent with their identification decision. 
An eyewitness, for example, might make an identification and later learn that 
the suspect was in possession of stolen goods or that he or she had committed 
a similar offense in the past. 
Concluding remarks 
Eyewitnesses who claim to be very confident about their identifications prob-
ably believe that the person they identified matches their memory for the 
culprit. Does this belief on the part of an eyewitness serve as a reliable cue 
to his or her accuracy? Given the large number of studies that have found 
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Table 16.1. Luus and Wells's confidence malleability study 
Witnesses' 
self-rated 
Postidentification information confidence 
No information (control) 
Witness receives no information regarding the identification decision of co- 6.90" 
witness 
Same information 
Co-witness allegedly !Ded the same person 8.77,, 
Not present 
Co-witness allegedly did not believe the suspect was present in the photo 3.57, 
spread 
Different identification 
Co-witness allegedly identified a different person (a person who looks similar 4.67, 
to the one he/she identified) 
Implausibly-different identification 
Co-witness allegedly identified a different person (one who looks dissimilar to 7.87,, 
his/her choice) 
Different/same 
Witness is told that the co-witness !Ded a different person (one who looks 4.60, 
similar to his/her choice); the experimenter later corrects the information, 
stating that the other witness identified the same person 
Same/different 
Witness is told that the co-witness !Ded the same person; experimenter later 8.33,, 
corrects that information, stating that the co-witness IDed a different person 
(one who looks similar to the one he/she identified) 
Same/withdraw 
Witness is told that the co-witness identified the same person; the 8.53,, 
experimenter later withdraws that information, stating that she is not sure who 
the co-witness identified 
Different/withdraw 
Witness is told that the co-witness identified a different person; the 6.13" 
experimenter later withdraws this information, stating that she is not sure who 
the co-witness identified 
Note: Means not sharing a common subscript differ at p < .05 using a Newman-Keuls 
analysis. 
little relation between confidence and accuracy, we caution against assuming 
that such reliability exists. Eyewitnesses' statements of confidence in their 
identifications might be only partly determined by how similar the identified 
person is to their memories of the culprit. The research reviewed in this 
chapter suggests that, in many cases, a statement of confidence could derive 
from social influences as well as individual differences across witnesses. These 
additional influences may sometimes overshadow the similarity between the 
identified person and the eyewitness's memory of that person. 
This is problematic to the extent that these additional determinants of 
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confidence are unrelated to eyewitness accuracy because the eyewitness iden-
tification problem is not a question of false identifications per se but rather 
one of credible or persuasive false identifications (Wells et al., 1979). Hence, 
the danger is that eyewitnesses who make false identifications might also firmly 
believe they have identified the culprit. This combination of false identification 
testimony with a confident belief in its validity creates the potential for mis-
carriage of justice. 
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